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ABSTR ACT: Many U.S. nursing homes have serious quality problems, in part, because of inadequate levels of nurse staffing. This commentary focuses on 
two issues. First, there is a need for higher minimum nurse staffing standards for U.S. nursing homes based on multiple research studies showing a positive 
relationship between nursing home quality and staffing and the benefits of implementing higher minimum staffing standards. Studies have identified the 
minimum staffing levels necessary to provide care consistent with the federal regulations, but many U.S. facilities have dangerously low staffing. Second, 
the barriers to staffing reform are discussed. These include economic concerns about costs and a focus on financial incentives. The enforcement of existing 
staffing standards has been weak, and strong nursing home industry political opposition has limited efforts to establish higher standards. Researchers should 
study the ways to improve staffing standards and new payment, regulatory, and political strategies to improve nursing home staffing and quality.
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Introduction
Following a decade of controversies about poor nursing home 
care, the U.S. Congress adopted stronger requirements and 
oversight of nursing homes with the passage of the Nursing 
Home Reform Act in 1987.1 Since 1987, the U.S. Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services (USCMS) has developed a 
range of new initiatives to improve nursing home quality and 
implemented new requirements in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010.2,3 These efforts have included 
revisions in policies and survey procedures, public reporting 
of nursing home quality, and other efforts that have resulted 
in some positive changes in nursing home care, such as reduc-
tions in the use of physical restraints.4
Over the years, U.S. government studies and investiga-
tive reports have found that many nursing homes continue to 
have serious quality problems.5–11 In the U.S., in 2013, over 
120,000 deficiencies were issued to nursing homes for regu-
latory violations, while 2,466 civil money penalties and 524 
denial of payments were issued for serious quality violation.12 
Furthermore, 20.5% of nursing homes received deficiencies 
for causing the potential for or actual harm or jeopardy to resi-
dents in 201413 and 6% of homes were rated as substandard.14 
Overall, these regulatory actions show that nursing homes 
still need to improve the nursing home quality.
Recently, the U.S. Office of the Inspector General found 
that 33% of Medicare nursing home resident sample experi-
enced adverse events, resulting in harm or death during the 
first 35 days of a postacute skilled nursing stay.15 Medicare 
beneficiaries had over 2.5 million nursing home admissions in 
2011, which cost about $28 billion. Sixty percent of the adverse 
events in the study were related to substandard treatment, 
inadequate monitoring, and/or failures or delays in treatment 
by nursing staff and others, costing $2.8 billion for Medicare.15 
A separate study found that 25% of Medicare nursing home 
residents were readmitted to the hospital for common and pre-
ventable problems in 2011 at a cost of $14 billion.16
One important underlying reason for quality problems 
is inadequate nurse staffing levels. In addition to reform-
ing the oversight process, the Nursing Home Reform Act of 
1987 required nursing homes to have sufficient staff to meet 
the needs of residents and one registered nurse (RN) Director 
of Nursing on duty for eight hours a day, seven days a week, 
and a licensed nurse in evening and night shifts,1 but this 
standard has been criticized as inadequate.17,18 Subsequently, 
41 states have established higher staffing standards than the 
federal standards; however, even with higher standards, most 
state standards remain well below the levels recommended by 
experts.17,19
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In 2015, the U.S. government proposed new nursing 
home regulations to strengthen the quality of nursing home 
care.20 Unfortunately, the proposed regulations do not change 
the federal staffing standard, even though the previous stan-
dards are considered too low, and resident acuity has increased 
dramatically since 1987.21 For example, the percent of total 
Medicare resident days classified as needing intensive rehabil-
itation and nursing care increased from 29 to 79 days between 
2002 and 2013.21 Although resident acuity appears to be over-
stated because nursing homes have incentives for upcoding 
acuity to increase revenues,21 there is clearly increased associa-
tion with early hospital discharge to nursing homes. Under the 
newly proposed regulations, nursing homes would be allowed 
to continue to set their own staffing levels without a higher 
federal minimum standard than the current requirement.
In the U.S., 15,600 licensed nursing homes must provide 
RNs (with a minimum of two to four years of training) and 
licensed professional nurses (with one to two years of training) 
on staff.22 Licensed residential care homes must also provide 
care but are not required to provide registered or licensed 
nurses. In some countries such as Canada, nursing homes are 
called residential care homes or homes for the aged and are equiva-
lent to nursing homes because they also require registered or 
licensed nurses.22 This article focuses on nursing homes that 
require licensed nursing staff.
First, this commentary examines the need for higher 
federal minimum nursing staff standards for RNs and total 
nursing staff in U.S. nursing homes and provides a rationale 
for this perspective. Second, this commentary examines the 
barriers to adopting higher federal staffing standards in the 
U.S. The regulation of nursing home staffing in the U.S. is 
expected to be of interest to researchers and policy makers in 
other countries that have low nursing home staffing standards 
and staffing levels such as in Canada and England.22,23
Part I: Nurse Staffing and Quality
High nurse staffing levels and quality. Over the past 
25  years, numerous research studies have documented a 
strong positive impact of nurse staffing on both care process 
and outcome measures.18 Over 150 staffing studies have been 
documented in systematic reviews, conducted primarily in the 
U.S. but also including studies in Canada, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Norway, and Sweden.24–28 The strongest positive 
relationships are found between RNs (with two to four years 
of training) and quality, which is stronger than the relation-
ship between licensed vocational/practical nurses (LVNs/
LPNs; who have less training than RNs) and quality. Total 
nurse staffing levels (which includes RNs, LVNs/LPNs, and 
certified nursing assistants [CNAs; with about two weeks of 
training]) are also related to quality.24–28
Although some studies have found mixed results, many 
of these had methodological problems with small sample sizes, 
single-state analysis, and cross-sectional designs.27 In addi-
tion, weak relationships may be found when studies include 
nursing homes with extremely low staffing, because evidence 
suggests that there is a minimum threshold of staffing that 
must be reached before staffing levels show higher quality.17,29 
Longitudinal studies and studies that take into account the 
complex endogenous relationships between RN staffing, resi-
dent acuity, and quality have generally shown strong positive 
relationships between staffing and quality of care.30–32
While a minimum staffing level is a necessary prerequi-
site to providing good quality of care, nursing staff also must 
be well trained and managed. High professional staff mix 
(ratios of RN to total staffing levels), low turnover rates, con-
sistency of staffing, and low use of agency staff are all strongly 
associated with high quality.33–37 Staffing levels and the other 
factors are interrelated. For example, low staffing levels are 
associated with high turnover rates and vice versa.38 It is 
likely that adequate staffing levels must be addressed before 
improvements can be made in other factors such as turnover, 
management, and competency.
Implementation of higher minimum staffing 
standards improves quality. Many studies have specifi-
cally identified the benefits of implementing higher federal 
and state staffing standards. The proportion of residents with 
pressure ulcers, physical restraints, and urinary catheters 
decreased, following the implementation of the U.S. Nursing 
Home Reform Act in 1987, in part, due to adoption of the 
24-hour licensed nursing standard.39 Moreover, numerous 
studies have consistently shown that higher state minimum 
staffing levels (beyond the federal minimum requirements) 
have had significant positive effects on staffing levels and 
quality outcomes.19,31,40–45 In addition, higher state minimum 
RN and total nurse staffing have been shown to have a 
stronger effect on nursing home staffing levels than higher 
Medicaid payment rates.31
CMS and experts recommend higher minimum staff-
ing levels. A USCMS study in 2001 established the impor-
tance of having a minimum of 0.75 RN hours per resident day 
(hprd), 0.55 LVN/LPN hprd, and 2.8 (to 3.0) CNA hprd, for a 
total of 4.1 nursing hprd to meet the federal quality standards 
(Table 1).17 As part of this study, a simulation model of CNAs 
established the minimum number of staff necessary to pro-
vide five basic aspects of daily care in a facility with different 
levels of resident acuity. The results found that the minimum 
threshold for CNA staffing is 2.8 hprd to ensure consistent, 
timely care to residents.17
This recommended minimum threshold level was later 
confirmed in a 2004 observational study of nursing home 
staffing29 and in a reanalysis by Abt Associates in 2011.46 
Across the entire distribution of staffing levels, there is a 
strong association between higher total staffing levels and 
better outcomes as defined by lower survey deficiencies and 
improved resident quality measures from the Minimum Data 
Set (MDS) (eg, pressure ulcers).4,46,47 Staffing is a better pre-
dictor of deficiencies than MDS quality measures, probably 
because facility-reported MDS quality measures appear to be 
Higher minimum staffing standards in U.S. nursing homes 
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inflated.46,47 Moreover, staffing is a better predictor of hospi-
talization rates than the MDS quality measures.46
Some experts have recommended higher minimum staff-
ing standards (a total of 4.55 hprd) to improve the quality 
of nursing home care, with adjustments for resident acuity 
or case mix.48 A number of organizations have endorsed the 
minimum of 4.1 hprd standard, have recommended that at 
least 30% of total nursing care hours should be provided by 
licensed nurses, and have recommended that RNs should be 
on duty for 24 hours per day. These organizations include 
the American Nurses Association, the Coalition of Geriatric 
Nursing Organizations, and the National Consumer Voice for 
Quality Long-Term Care.18,49,50
Nurse staffing levels are too low in half of U.S. nursing 
homes. Total facility-reported median staffing levels gradu-
ally increased from 3.7 hprd in 2009 to 3.97 hprd in 2014 and 
RN hours increased from 0.5 to 0.7 hprd in the same period, 
with wide variations across states.4,47
In spite of improvements, Table 1 shows that the median 
nursing home has RN, CNA, and total staffing levels, which 
are below the CMS recommended standard. Table 1 also 
shows that nursing homes in the lowest quartile on staff-
ing (n =  3,848) reported CNA staffing below 2.08 hprd in 
2014, which translates into ratios of about 10–11 residents to 
one CNA in the day and evening shifts when the most labor 
intensive care (eg, feeding assistance and incontinence care) 
has to be provided. The lowest quartile of nursing homes also 
reported half or less the average RN staffing, which reduces 
the probability that CNAs with high workloads are well man-
aged. Nursing homes with low total staffing are highly likely 
to have low RN and LVN/LPN nurse staffing as well.46,47 
Thus, half of the nursing homes have low staffing and at least 
a quarter have dangerously low staffing.
Staffing levels need to be adjusted for resident acuity. 
Because it is widely agreed that staffing levels should be 
increased beyond the CMS minimum recommended level 
when resident acuity levels increase,18,49,50 CMS’s Medicare 
Nursing Home Compare Five-Star Rating System devel-
oped a method to determine the minimum nurse staffing 
levels needed for each U.S. nursing home based on its resident 
acuity.51 The staffing star rating is based on two measures: 
total nursing hprd (RN + LVN/LPN + CNA hours) and RN-
specific hprd. CMS calculates the expected hours of care based 
on the resident acuity (case mix) obtained from the Resource 
Utilization Group scores reported by each facility and CMS 
staff time measurement studies published in 2000.52 The 
CMS staffing rating is based on facility staffing compared 
with other nursing homes and the staffing thresholds identi-
fied in its 2001 staffing study and confirmed in 2011.17,46,47
CMS’s recent analysis of expected staffing levels taking 
into account acuity indicates that the average U.S. nursing 
home should have 4.17 total nursing hprd, including 1.08 RN 
hprd (Table 1). The actual total staffing level for almost 60% 
of facilities is below their expected level based on facility case 
mix. Almost 80% have RN staffing levels below, 30% have 
LVN staffing below, and 54% have CNA staffing below the 
expected levels (data not shown).47
The minimum expected staffing based on acuity should 
be higher than the recommended minimums. However, the 
average expected CNA staffing level of 2.43 hprd is well 
below the CMS study that recommended a minimum staffing 
level of 2.8 hours. This occurred because the CMS staff time 
studies used for the five-star system were based on the usual 
staffing reported in a selected sample home without assurance 
that the care actually met the quality standards.53 A more 
recent time study (called STRIVE) had the same weakness 
and did not include nursing management time. Because resi-
dent acuity has increased over time,46 CMS needs to update 
its staffing time studies for different levels of acuity with the 
assurance that resident care actually meets acceptable quality 
Table 1. Nursing hours per resident day reported in all U.S. nursing homes in 2014 compared to recommended minimum staffing levels and 
expected staffing levels.
TOTAL NUMBER OF NURSING HOMES 
(15,391) AND PERCENTILES
RN HOURS PER 
RESIDENT DAY 
LVN/LPN HOURS 
PER RESIDENT DAY
CNA HOURS PER 
RESIDENT DAY
TOTAL NURSING HOURS 
PER RESIDENT DAY
90% n = 1,539 1.36 1.26 3.27 5.39
75% n = 3,848 0.98 1.02 2.80 4.55
Mean 1.00 0.90 2.64 4.54
Median n = 7,696 0.72 0.81 2.40 3.97
25% n = 3,848 0.53 0.60 2.08 3.53
10% n = 1,539 0.39 0.39 1.83 3.18
cMS study recommended  
minimum standard (2)
0.75 0.55 2.80 4.10
Average CMS expected staffing based 
on resident acuity (3)
1.08 0.66 2.43 4.17
Notes: (1) CMS Casper Nursing Home Staffing Data (2014). (2) USCMS. (2001). (3) abt associates (2015).
Abbreviations: rn, registered nurses; lvn/lPn, licensed vocational or licensed practical nurse; CNA, certified nursing assistants. 
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standards. New time studies should be used to develop an 
improved methodology for calculating expected nurse staffing 
levels based on acuity.
Part II: Barriers to Staffing Reform
Given the existing knowledge about the importance of nurse 
staffing to nursing home quality and the low staffing levels in 
many nursing homes, why has the U.S. not made more prog-
ress in improving staffing levels and nursing home quality? 
Perhaps Binstock’s argument that the U.S.’s ideological shift 
to neoliberalism beginning in the late 1970s (that portrays 
old-age benefits as burdensome and focuses on free market 
policies) can explain the unwillingness to enact stronger regu-
latory and staffing requirements.54 Many economic, political, 
public policy, and sociological theories could help understand 
the failure to adopt staffing reform. While it is beyond the 
scope of this commentary to discuss the theoretical issues, 
some barriers are discussed below.
Economic issues. Since the passage of the U.S. 1987 
Nursing Home Reform Act, the primary policy focus has been 
on controlling health expenditures including nursing home 
costs, and increased staffing standards appear to conflict with 
cost controls. To control costs, the U.S. Congress adopted 
Medicare (for aged and disabled) prospective payment rates 
for nursing homes in 1997. These rates have been higher than 
the cost of providing care, and Medicare profit margins have 
been extremely high for many years (ranging from 10% to 21% 
annually between 2000 and 2014 and over 13% in 2014).21 
Total profit margins are lower when all payer revenues are 
considered, and Medicare appears to be cross-subsidizing the 
low state Medicaid rates.21,55
Medicare does not conduct financial audits and has no 
limits on administrative costs and profits, which are often 
hidden in public reports.21,56,57 The Medicare payment sys-
tem, which pays higher rates for higher resident acuity, gives 
the facilities incentives to upcode resident acuity, especially 
because CMS did not audit resident assessments for accuracy, 
which CMS plans to implement in the future.2 Prospective 
payment also allows the facilities to keep staffing levels low 
because their payment rates are not directly tied to nurse staff-
ing levels.
The U.S. Congress has given state Medicaid programs (for 
low-income populations) wide discretion in setting nursing 
home payment rates, which have been lower than Medicare 
rates and vary by state. Studies show a positive relationship 
between higher Medicaid funding, increased staffing,58 and 
higher quality.59 Nevertheless, state Medicaid programs have 
financial incentives to keep payment rates low, which can have 
a negative impact on staffing levels, especially in facilities 
with high proportions of Medicaid residents. State Medicaid 
reimbursement methods have been found to be overly com-
plex and burdensome and have failed to achieve policy goals 
of improving quality.60 Moreover, there are incentives for 
cost-shifting between Medicare and Medicaid fee-for-service 
policies, which both focus on overall cost controls rather than 
quality outcomes.61
Under current federal and state payment systems, nursing 
homes are able to make choices on how to allocate their 
resources with few regulatory restrictions. In 2010, California 
nursing homes spent only 36% of total revenues (including 
Medicare and Medicaid) on staffing and over 20% on admin-
istration and profits.56,57
About 70% of U.S. nursing homes are for-profit facili-
ties with an orientation to maximizing profits for owners and 
shareholders.13 The profit incentive has been shown to be 
directly related to low staffing. For-profit nursing homes and 
for-profit chains operate with lower staffing and more quality 
deficiencies (violations) compared with nonprofit facilities.62–64 
Facilities with the highest profit margins have been found to 
have the poorest quality.65
Recognizing nursing home quality problems, the U.S. 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 focused efforts on market-
based strategies rather than on regulatory requirements such 
as staffing standards. These efforts included increasing public 
disclosure of ownership and expenditures, public reporting 
using Medicare Nursing Home Compare, quality improve-
ment programs, and pay-for-performance programs.3 Nurse 
staffing levels were incorporated as incentives into the public 
reporting system and the nursing home pay-for-performance 
demonstration.
Recently, nursing home pay-for-performance demonstra-
tions were established in eight states with incentives tied to 
fewer deficiencies and higher staffing levels. Unfortunately, 
these Medicaid demonstrations failed to consistently achieve 
quality improvements and increase staffing levels in nursing 
homes, possibly because the incentive bonuses were too low.66 
This suggests that regulatory requirements may have more 
impact on staffing than market-based policies.
Regulatory enforcement. The CMS is the federal agency 
responsible for setting federal nursing home standards and for 
regulatory oversight. CMS contracts with state agencies to 
carry out the federal guidelines for surveys, complaint inves-
tigations, and enforcement compliance. Numerous investi-
gations by governmental and Congressional agencies have 
found that U.S. nursing home violations are underidentified, 
and serious violations are underrated by state surveyors, while 
enforcement varies widely across and within states.5–9 Often 
facilities are not given penalties for serious violations, or the 
penalties are so minimal that enforcement does not result in 
compliance.5–9,67 Moreover, nursing homes are seldom termi-
nated from the Medicare/Medicaid programs as a result of 
violations. State political leadership has been found to be a 
factor influencing the stringency of nursing home oversight, 
where more liberal leadership is associated with stronger 
regulation and conservative leadership with less regulation.68 
A number of government reports have urged CMS to improve 
its regulatory oversight and the consistency of enforcement 
across and within states.5–9
Higher minimum staffing standards in U.S. nursing homes 
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Within the U.S. regulatory environment, the enforcement 
of current staffing requirements has been weak. Deficiencies 
for low or inadequate staffing levels are rarely issued by state 
inspectors, and CMS does not have the guidelines for penal-
ties for staffing violations.68,69 When the state agencies adopt 
stronger enforcement programs, the results show improve-
ment in staffing and quality of care.19,42 To have a stronger 
deterrent effect, CMS regulations would need to specify pen-
alties for inadequate staffing levels, such as imposing auto-
matic fines and holds on admissions until acceptable staffing 
levels are reached. New approaches are needed to make the 
enforcement of existing staffing standards more effective in 
improving staffing and quality.
Political influences. Political conflict has been a major 
factor preventing the adoption of higher staffing standards 
in the U.S. The U.S. nursing home industry has consistently 
opposed regulatory requirements and supported higher reim-
bursement rate policies and payment incentive programs to 
improve nursing home quality.70 In contrast, U.S. consumer 
advocacy groups have advocated for higher staffing require-
ments and more aggressive regulatory enforcement to improve 
quality.70 Political ideologies are sharply divided between con-
servative and liberal politicians, where conservatives tend to 
strongly oppose regulatory approaches in contrast to liberal 
views that tend to support government interventions in the 
marketplace.70 The role of ideology and partisanship in an era 
of divided government can preclude reaching political consen-
sus on nursing home policies.
Nursing homes, similar to other health-care industries, 
attempt to influence public policies through campaign con-
tributions, association lobbying, and educational activities. 
Between 2006 and 2009, the health sector contributed 
$1.7 billion in lobbying the U.S. Congress and federal agen-
cies.71 The health industry (including nursing homes) contri-
butions were $5 billion from 1990 to 2008.72 In 2013–2014, 
the American Health Care Association (AHCA) representing 
nursing homes was one of the top 16 health contributors to 
federal campaigns.73 These contributions do not include those 
made by individual nursing home owners, association lobby-
ing, and industry educational activities.
State campaign contributions in the U.S. have also 
involved the nursing home industry. The Kentucky nursing 
home industry gave $1.8 million to Kentucky federal and 
state politicians over the past decade while lobbying against 
bills requiring them to hire more employees, increasing fines 
for violations, and prosecuting elder abuse.74 Nursing home 
industry campaign contributions were recently documented in 
Arkansas for appellate court races75 and in Louisiana cam-
paign races for state policy makers.76
The revolving door of policymakers has been another 
long-standing concern, where health policymakers at the fed-
eral and state levels leave government to take jobs as lobbyists, 
consultants, and strategists. Government often hires health 
industry managers into high-level government positions,73 
and these managers may have pro-industry and antiregulatory 
perspectives and policies. Revolving doors between nursing 
home companies/associations and government may occur at 
the federal and state levels, and this may explain why public 
officials and providers have been found to hold similar views 
supporting market-incentive programs rather than regulatory 
approaches.70
The imbalance of power between the nursing home 
industry and consumer advocates has prevented the establish-
ment of higher federal staffing standards. The AHCA often 
hires leading politicians into leadership roles and has a large 
staff in Washington, D.C., known for its effective lobbying 
campaigns. The reliance of members of Congress on lobbyists 
and special interest groups has been well documented.77
Although there has been a large growth in old-age inter-
est groups in the U.S., the effectiveness of their advocacy has 
been questionable54 and very few of these advocacy groups 
focus on nursing home issues. Consumer organizations that do 
advocate for nursing home issues have faced a constant finan-
cial struggle to survive. Although consumer advocates were 
able to obtain more disclosure requirements for nursing home 
ownership and expenditures, payroll reporting of staffing, and 
staff criminal background checks in the ACA of 2010,3 they 
have not been able to overcome the strong industry opposition 
to higher staffing standards.
Conclusion
Low staffing levels and poor quality of care continue to be 
problems in a significant number of U.S. nursing homes, 
despite the overall staffing improvements in many homes. The 
problems of low nursing home staffing have also been found 
in other countries such as the Canada and England.22,23 Com-
pelling evidence supports the need for higher U.S. minimum 
nurse staffing standards, adjusted for resident acuity, to ensure 
adequate quality of nursing home care as a necessary precon-
dition for making other quality improvements such as in lead-
ership, management, and training. Economic, regulatory, and 
political solutions are needed to ensure that all nursing homes 
provide safe and high quality of care. Researchers should not 
only take up the challenge of studying barriers to reform but 
also studying new regulatory, payment, and accountability 
strategies to improve nursing home staffing and quality.
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